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Introduction
The concept of social practice has been widely used in sociology and organisational studies to the point that many scholars have started to speak about the practice turn in social theory (e.g. Schatzki, Knorr-Cetina, & Von Savigny, 2001; Reckwitz, 2002a; Stern, 2003) . It is difficult to characterize this turn when there are so many partially overlapping, yet different approaches associated with it. Nevertheless, the term practice theory is largely identified with a group of sociologists and philosophers in the late twentieth century who either presented a fully fleshed-out theory of practice or who at least found practice to be an important concept in their work. Bourdieu (1977) , Giddens (1984) and ethnomethodologists are often mentioned as social theorists, and
Heidegger along with Wittgenstein in his later works are the philosophers cited as establishing the background for the new practice theory (see e.g. Schatzki, 2001, p. 1; Reckwitz 2002a, pp. 243-244; Turner, 2007, p. 111; Rouse, 2007, p. 501; Schmidt, & Volbers 2011, p. 19 ). Latour and other actor-network theorists are also often mentioned (e.g. Reckwitz, 2002a; Schmidt & Volbers, 2011) , as is Foucault. Actor-network theory emerged from constructivist science and technology studies, which examined laboratory and scientific practices (Pickering, 1992) and also led to theoretical accounts of the concept of practice (Pickering, 1995; Rouse, 1996) .
Practice-based approaches were widely adopted in organisational studies in the 1990s, especially in organisational learning and knowledge management (Blackler, 1993; Nicolini, Gherardi, & Yanow, 2003; Brown & Duguid 2001) . Since the 1990s several approaches have been developed to study strategy as practice instead of analysing strategy as rational decisionmaking or planning (Whittington, 1996; Samra-Fredericks, 2003 , Jarzabkowski, 2005 . In organisational studies Schatzki's (1996) and Reckwitz's (2002a) understanding of practice theory are widely cited and used.
That is why we will refer to the interpretations of those two scholars.
We will suggest that an important shared feature of the new practice theories is their emphasis on habituality of practice, that is, the recognition of the primacy of pre-reflective embodied actions in contrast of individual rationality and conscious reflection. We suggest that this position makes it difficult for these theories to make sense of the change of human practices. In contrast, the classical practice theories, pragmatism and cultural-historical activity theory -a heir the of dialectical tradition -focused from the beginning to explain the change and development in human practices. They focus on how people can influence such changes when emerging problems or contradictions in practices are faced (Miettinen, 2006) .
Cultural-historical activity theory (Engeström, Miettinen, & Punamäki, 1999) and sociocultural approaches (Chaiklin & Lave, 1993) have their roots in the work of the Russian psychologist Lev Vygotsky and his followers, who took up Hegel's and Marx's concept of work as an important starting point.
Work is here understood as a prototype of creative activity mediated by tools and cultural artefacts and as a process in which humans simultaneously create both themselves and their material culture. In pragmatism, the crisis of established habits requires reflection of the condition of activity and the formation of a working hypothesis for the experimentation of a new way of acting. Both activity theory and pragmatism regard intervention and experimentation as a means of influencing the direction of the change, and both have developed methods of doing just that. Activity theory in particular, based on the concept of mediation by cultural artefacts, has developed a vocabulary for dealing with the materiality of human practice.
In this paper we will proceed as follows. Firstly, we will discuss some of the differences between the classical and a selection of new postmodern theories of practice. Secondly, we will discuss the problem of habituality of practice and its consequences for making sense of the change of activities.
Thirdly we will analyse the idea of reflection as a mechanism of transforming habits. Fourthly we will bring forth theories of artefacts in practice theories. We maintain that the transformation of artefacts or remediation, that is, collective elaboration of shared meditational artefacts -suggested by the activity theoryis an essential part of the transformation of practices. In addition we suggest that an analysis is needed of the various functions that different artefacts play in activity.
Bringing back the classical practice theories
The concept of practice, or praxis, is not, of course, new, either in philosophy or in the social sciences. The first generation of practice theorising took place in the late nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries. The ideas of this generation were summarised by the philosopher Richard Bernstein (1971) As David Stern (2003, p. 188) points out, most of the accounts of the practice turn and theorizing do not refer, or refer only in passing, to these classical philosophical antecedents of the practice concept. The philosophical roots of the new practice theories are found in the works of Heidegger and Wittgenstein. Current practice approach could also be characterized as postmodern practice theory, since it is a "response to failures of projects of modernity or enlightenment" (Turner 2007, p. 110) .
We, in turn, find Bernstein's (1971) distinction among his four philosophical approaches to praxis and action still relevant for depicting the differences and similarities among philosophical concepts of practice. Each of the philosophical traditions provide different basic concepts to make sense of practice or activity. Activity theory, an heir to Hegel and Marx, emphasises cultural (artefact) mediation and the object-orientedness of activity (Vygotsky, 1978; Leont'ev, 1978) . Pragmatism deals with habits and their transformation through reflection and inquiry (Dewey, 1929 (Dewey, /1988 . Critical realism and its theories of transformational human activity and intentional agency continue the analytical tradition today (Bhaskar, 1986; Archer, 2000) . Two first traditions analyzed by Bernstein, namely dialectical tradition -represented today by activity theory -and pragmatism are far less often used in these interpretations than are the phenomenologically influenced approaches, although new practice theories have absorbed influences from many directions Reckwitz, 2002a) . If a single unifying feature of the current approach to practice should be named, then habituality -the primacy of routinized, prereflective, and/or unconscious, embodied actions and dispositions to actions in contrast to individual rationality and reflectionwould be a good candidate.
Many distinguished observers, however, have pointed out that a habitual concept of practice has difficulties in making sense of the change in practices or of the contribution of individual agency to the process of change (Emirbayer, & Mische, 1998; Shusterman, 2008) . Emirbayer and Mische (1998, p. 983 ) observe that such theorists as Bourdieu and Giddens focus on low-level reflectivity and "do not show us how schemes of action can be challenged, reconsidered, and reformulated." They (Emirbayer, & Mische, p. 1006) find it important to create circumstances that "provoke or facilitate" human actors to gain imaginative distance from iterative, habitual responses, "thereby reformulating past patterns through the projection of alternative future trajectories." Richard Shusterman (2008) finds that the reflective level of somatic consciousness helps to (Shusterman, p. 74 ) "acquire better means to correct inadequacies of our unreflective bodily habits." Karin Knorr-Cetina (2001, p. 175) states that a habitual concept of practice is insufficient for making sense of what she calls knowledge-centered activities. The transformation of practices is emphasized also by critical realism (Bhaskar, 1986 ).
As suggested above, the first two traditions introduced by Bernstein, namely the dialectical tradition (the Hegelian/Marxist) and the pragmatist tradition, can be characterized as classical or modernist theories of practice, and they share many ideas with each other (Miettinen, Samra-Fredericks, & Yanow, 2009 ). The pragmatist concept of habit also has a family relationship to the concepts of habitus and dispositions, which are important for the new social theories of practice. However, both pragmatism and activity theory find reflection, inquiry and thought -rather than practical coping -instrumental for agency and for the transformation of practices. The social theories of practice inspired by phenomenology regard the concept of embodied skills and their unconscious adaptation to new situations as central to understanding human practice and give reflection and thought only secondary significance in human activity. On the other hand, without a concept of an artefact, reflection is easily transformed into individual thought, or into a formation of collectively shared ideas lacking contact with the materiality of human activity.
Habituality, practical understanding and change of practices
The ideas of habituality and the primacy of unconscious, embodied actions also call for a redefinition of knowledge and its role in human practices. According to Theodor Schatzki (2002) Examples of what I have in mind are Bourdieu's habitus, otherwise called practical sense ("having a feeling for a game"), and Giddens's practical consciousness ("tacitly grasping a rule"), both conceptualizations [sic] the phenomenon of knowing how to go on highlighted in Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations. Habitus and practical consciousness are alleged either always (Bourdieu) or often (Giddens) alleged to determine what people on particular occasions do. As a result, these phenomena also allegedly provide explanations of the particular actions involved. (Schatzki, 2002, p. 78-79.) All of these concepts refer to skills, dispositions, pre-discursive rules and schemes of action that underlie activity. These dispositions are the primary forms of knowledge, and they are mostly unconscious and/or pre-reflective. In Writers such as Henry Mintzberg and Robert Solomon, like us, think that skills are more important than theory when it comes to dealing with the real world. We go beyond these thinkers in that we claim, first, that the skills that form the background for dealing with people, things, and selves contain an understanding of what it is to be anything at all and that taking up such practices gives one an identity and so gives one's life meaning …. (Spinosa, Flores, & Dreyfus, p. 191) Also, for the ethnomethodologists the attempts to reflect consciously and discursively the forms of activity, that is, formulations of activity, are mostly about legitimating actions, which already by themselves exhibit orderly structure and rationality (Lynch, 1995) .
Karin Knorr-Cetina (2001, p. 175) has presented an explicit sociological critique of a habitus-, skill-and rule-based understanding of practice. In her view, research work and more generally professional work cannot be explained in terms of routine procedures. That is why she opts for the notion of practice, which is more dynamic and includes the potential for change. The challenge is "to dissociate the notion of practice somewhat from its fixation on human dispositions and habits, and from the connotation of iterative procedural routines" (Knorr-Cetina, 2001, p. 187) . Knorr-Cetina thinks that, in a contemporary knowledge society, we need to understand the changes taking place in the knowledge processes themselves. To make sense of these we have to study their objectual relationships, the relationship of professionals to the objects of their work and practice. The objects themselves are changing in a 'knowledge society'. Compared with mass products or services, these objects are ever more complex, dispersed and in constant need of being redefined and reconstructed. This is why they can be characterized in terms of open, constantly unfolding epistemic objects or knowledge objects.
The lack in completeness of being is crucial: objects of knowledge in many fields have material instantiations, but they must simultaneously be conceived of as unfolding structures of absences: as things that continually 'explode' and 'mutate' into something else, and that are as much defined by what they are not …than by what they are. (KnorrCetina, 2001, p. 182) According to , for understanding epistemic practice, the process of object-subject differentiation is crucial. She argues that Heidegger's concept of instrumental being-in-the-world deals primarily with the unselfconscious, but nonetheless goal-directed employment of a ready-to-hand equipment. In such a being-in-the-world the equipment becomes transparent or invisible, and a subject does not think of him/herself as separate from the immediate activity. This is an adequate description of routine or habitual practice, even in research work. However, when such a practice becomes problematic, the undifferentiated unity is dissociated from a subject-object relationship in which the properties of the object become an object of knowing and transformation. In this relationship researchers actively search for and use resources to overcome the subject-object separation.
Knorr-Cetina's critique focuses on the change in the interaction between human subjects and increasingly complex objects. She, however, does not discuss the means of this interaction. The concept of mediation in activity theory underlines the interactive development of subject, cultural means and an object. A follower of Vygotsky, A.N. Leont'ev developed the idea of an objective, mediated structure of the human activity system. Human activity is object-oriented: "Activity necessarily enters into practical contact with objects that confront man, that divert it, change it, or enrich it" (Leont'ev, 1978, p. 56) .
The object of an activity, something to be transformed by the activity into a use-value, is a driving force behind the activity. The object of an activity is material, as well as simultaneously imagined and projected. Its formation and realisation take place by using a set of relevant mediational artefacts. When an object changes the means also need to be transformed. For example, the medical tools and procedures developed for treating infectious diseases do not on their own help in the treatment of diabetes or coronary diseases. The means need to be redesigned to meet the demands of the changed object by remediation. An object of activity turns into a means: a product designed and fabricated becomes a tool for use in another activity. The changing interrelationship between objects of activity and the means of their realisation is an important way to make sense of the materiality of human practice.
Breakdown of habits and reflection as explanations of transformation
Most of the philosophical approaches to practice, phenomenology and Deweyan pragmatism, as well as activity theory agree that the bodily interaction of individuals with the material and social environment is primary to cognition and thought. All of them recognize (at least to some extent) that reflection, thought and future orientation are needed when established ways of doing things (ready-to-hand, habits, routine operations) break down, and novel solutions are needed (Koschmann, Kuutti, & Hickman, 1998 When an established habit no longer functions an uncertainty and a crisis emerge and call for reflective thought and investigation of the situation (phase 1). The process of reflective thought starts with an attempt to define what is wrong in the situation (phase 2). The actor forms a tentative conception of the difficulty and defines the problem (Dewey, 1938 (Dewey, /1991 
):
Without a problem, there is blind groping in the dark. The way in which the problem is conceived decides what specific suggestions are entertained and which are dismissed; what data are selected and which rejected; it is the criterion for relevancy and irrelevancy of hypotheses and conceptual structures.
The analysis and diagnosis of the conditions take place in phase 3. The conditions include both material and social conditions including the means and resources with which the problem is supposed to be solved. The presupposition of a possible solution is called a working hypothesis. A working hypothesis can also be characterised as a guiding idea or a plan. Reasoning (phase 4) is composed of the elaboration of the meaning of ideas in relation to each other.
Through reasoning, thought experiments can be done. In phase 5 the working hypothesis is tested by trying to implement it in practice, by reconstructing a situation or an institutionalized way of acting. Dewey says that only the practical testing of the hypothesis in material activity makes it possible to draw conclusions about its validity (Dewey, 1916 (Dewey, /1985 :
Upon this view, thinking, or knowledge-getting, is far from being the armchair thing it is often supposed to be. (...) Hands and feet, apparatus and appliances of all kinds are as much a part of it as changes in the brain (…) Thinking is mental, not because of a peculiar stuff which enters into it or of peculiar non-natural activities which constitute it, but because of what physical acts and appliances do: the distinctive purpose for which they are employed and the distinctive results which they accomplish.
Although Dewey recognized the significance of tools and the dependency of an aim on the relevant means, curiously, tools are not included in his theory of inquiry. The only artefact mentioned in his cycle is a working hypothesis. Since tools and artefacts are included in habits, it would be natural to assume that the acquisition of new tools or the transformation of old ones is needed in order to experiment and change the situation or a practice.
In Bhaskar's transformational model of social activity (TMSA)
representing critical realism people reproduce or transform existing social structures. Transformativity is part of a social ontology that provides solutions to several mistaken dualisms prevailing in social theory (Bhaskar, 1986, p. The theory of expansive learning (Engeström, 1987) , a recent version of activity theory, has made sense of the process of reflection in terms of collective remediation. This process first traces the historically-formed contradictions of an activity that causes disturbances, problems or breakdowns.
A working hypothesis for a more advanced form of the activity or a zone of proximal development is formed and is expected to resolve the contradictions.
The process includes the modeling of the instruments for the projected new activity.
In activity theory the idea of theoretical concepts as a means of envisioning the future is inspired by Vygotsky's work on concept formation and by V.V. Davydov's theory of generalisation and theoretical thinking in education (1977) . In this methodology a theoretical concept also assumes the form of a germ cell, which refers to a new instrumentality and a corresponding form of action that is developed as a solution to the contradictions of an activity. The implementation and development of the germ cell may lead to the emergence of a new form of activity (Engeström, Engeström, & Kerosuo, 2003) . The reflection includes both concepts of and models for an alternative activity and the development of new tools and instrumentalities with which to experiment and develop the alternative (Miettinen & Virkkunen, 2005) .
Accordingly, the activity-theoretical approach regards retooling, that is, the shared creation of artefacts used, as a key of changing practices (Vygotsky, 1986) .
Introducing mediating artefacts
Recently there have been several attempts to clarify the fundamental role of artefacts in the change of activities and in the formation of agency. The sociologist Ian Burkitt calls cultural artefacts a prosthetic extension of the body and has emphasised how the human body and its capabilities are re-formed by cultural artefacts. He regards them as the basic units of cultural development instead of "memes" (Burkitt, 1999, p. 12) . In his theory of the evolution of human consciousness the psychologist Merlin Donald has convincingly suggested that modern human consciousness cannot be explained as the result of biological evolution alone. Instead, the key is the external memory or the externalisation of memory (Donald, 2001, p. 262) : "modern humans can employ a huge number of powerful external symbolic devices to store and retrieve cultural knowledge."
Bruno Latour has analysed the ways in which mankind (humanity)
"delegates" tasks and norms to artefacts (Latour, 1992) . As a result, technical artefacts have a script, an affordance, a function or a programme of action and goals (Latour, 1994) . Human agency is here distributed between men and
artefacts. This has been demonstrated in the empirical research conducted by Edwin Hutchins (1995) , as well as in other investigations into distributed cognition (Goodwin, 1995) . In these approaches, instead of working via cognitive processes in the head or in bodily schemes, human capabilities are preserved and transmitted, first of all, through the artefacts and the ways in which the artefacts are used. Where this is the case, a theory of artefacts, including representational artefacts, is needed to understand the dynamics of the change in practices.
Critical realist Clive Lawson (2007; has developed a theory of technological objects as an extension of human capabilities, and he provides a review of the extension theories. Electronic media can be understood as extensions of the information-processing functions of the nervous system. In activity theory and in the dialectical tradition (Ilyenkov, 1977b; Lektorsky, 1980 ) the objectification of activity into artefacts is emphasized as a key mechanism in the development of culture. A human being creates him/herself in the process of changing a part of the world and a culture, with a corresponding transformation of the mediational means. Human activity is objectified into cultural artefacts (Ilyenkov, 1977a , Lektorsky, 1980 . The embodiment of forms of human activity within artefacts is the primary means of learning and transmitting human achievement wherein the role of individual agents is also important. "All forms of activity (active faculties) are passed on only in the form of objects created by man for man" (Ilyenkov, 1977b, p. 277 ).
This insight goes back to Hegel, who suggested that the "spirit" develops through its objectifications into material forms, such as artefacts. Vladislav Lektorsky (1980, p. 137) world." Since both activity theory and pragmatism were committed to studying education and ontogeny, the idea of making people's lives better and creating conditions for the development of human capabilities has been central to both.
Such a position calls for the development of an interventionist research strategy. Dewey's experimentalist school in Chicago is one famous example.
The revival of pragmatism in social theory has focused on reintroducing the concepts of habitual action and transaction as methodological alternatives to dualistic approaches in the social sciences (e.g. Joas, 1996 , Kilpinen, 2009 ).
Thus far, however, the challenge of solving the problems of social practices has hardly been discussed. We find that social experimentation or, to use Dewey's term (1925/1988, p. 362) , the formation of communities of inquiry for the recognition and resolution of important conflicts and problems of societal activities, remains a major challenge, both for the old as well as the new practice theories, and is crucial for understanding transformative agency (see e.g. Bernstein, 2010) .
The modernist conceptions of progress represented by the classical practice theories might seem too simplistic or even naïve today, but they provide tools and means for dealing with rapidly changing world (see Emirbayer & Mische, 1998 , p. 1013 . The concept of artefact mediation and remediation emphasises that such a community needs not only to formulate a joint working hypothesis for its future activity, but also to develop and evaluate practical means for its accomplishment. 
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